THE SQL Server Blog Spot on the Web

Welcome to SQLblog.com - The SQL Server blog spot on the web Sign in | |
in Search

Michael Coles: Sergeant SQL

SQL Server development, news and information from the front lines

Hacking Social Security Numbers

According to this paper from the Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences (PNAS), social security numbers (SSNs) are pretty easy for hackers, identity thieves, and other miscreants to predict based on publicly available data. I found this interesting partly because I just recently (a few months ago) wrote a chapter for a book discussing security for SSNs.

Here's the deal - all SSNs have a very regular structure that looks like this: xxx-yy-zzzz. With 9 numeric digits there are 1 billion possible combinations that can be assigned.  And of course we have the same information that identity thieves have - the rules for SSN assignment are posted for the public at the Social Security Administration website.

Here are some of the key rules that determine how SSNs are assigned, summarized from the SSA website:

  • xxx is a 3-digit Area Number, and is assigned based on the ZIP Code from which the request to assign the SSN originates.
  • yy is a 2-digit Group Number, which is assigned in a predictable (nonconsecutive) order. The order of assignment of Group Numbers is also documented on the SSA website as well.  It's always a number between "01" and "99".
  • zzzz is a 4-digit Serial Number, which is a number between "0001" and "9999".
  • There are a few stray SSNs that have been taken out of circulation for various reasons (used in marketing campaigns, etc.)
  • And of course no SSN is ever reassigned.

According to the rules a bad guy can narrow down the scope of his search substantially just by eliminating all SSNs that begin with 8xx, 9xx, 666, and 000.  That eliminates a couple 100 million+.  No SSNs have been assigned with a Group Number above 772, eliminating tens of millions in the 773 - 799 range.  No SSNs have, or will be, assigned with Group Numbers of 00 or Serial Numbers of 0000, eliminating millions more.  In addition the Group Numbers that have been assigned are available from the SSA website high group list, knocking hundreds of millions more possible SSNs off the list.

This is just the beginning -- it gets better: 

If you know where a person applied for their SSN (in many cases this will be where they were born, or close to it) you can use the SSN Allocations list to narrow down the search substantially.  In some cases this won't work though, since some parents don't apply for an SSN for their child immediately at birth.

All this is to show how an identity thief can use the location and approximate date of birth to accurately guess the first 5 digits of the SSN.  The PNAS authors were able to correctly guess the first 5 digits of SSNs with a single try for 44% of their test records.

At the other end of the spectrum, identity thieves can use the SSA's Death Master File (DMF) to narrow down the last 4 digits (the Serial Number).  The PNAS authors used the DMF to figure out statistical distributions of SSN Serial Numbers to dramatically narrow down the last 4 digits.  They correctly guessed the complete SSNs for 8.5% of the test records with less than 1,000 attempts each; making the SSN for 8.5% of those tested less secure than a 4-digit ATM card PIN (in fact the authors compared it to an insecure 3-digit financial PIN).

The authors' testing showed that overall full SSNs can be guessed with an accuracy of between 0.08% to 10% with less than 1,000 attempts each.  In rural areas they guessed complete SSNs at the rate of >60% for rural areas on the very first attempt.

To put some hard numbers to it, the authors estimated (based on various fairly reasonable assumptions), that an identity thief targeting a specific location (like a given state) could guess SSNs and obtain credit card accounts at the rate of about 47 per minute.

Makes you wonder how secure your SSN is, really.

Published Sunday, July 12, 2009 9:09 PM by Mike C

Comments

 

Atul Sharma said:

Huh... Then it should be changed to Social Number, rather than Social Security Number.

July 13, 2009 4:44 PM
 

Mike C said:

Very funny :)  SSN minus the "Security" -- I like it!

July 13, 2009 10:09 PM
 

Robert Conway said:

If there are a billion permutations...and we currently have over 300 million people...it seems that a wag would produce a 1 in 3 success rate from the get go...Obviously this narrows once one understands the formatting mentioned above..No wonder identity theft is so rampant.

July 14, 2009 9:05 AM
 

Robert Conway said:

What would alpha numeric do to the combination...replacing the first 9 digits with any of the 28 characters...That would seem to be a solution for the future...The social security administration could just come up with a random number generator (if that's possible) and re-assign the same numbers to victims of Identity theft replacing one with the other...This would seem to hit two problems with one number...or character wouldn't it?  The victims would still be able to use the majority of the remnants of their old numbers while the SSN could be tagged as being compromised in the past...I'm sure that you are going to tell me I haven't thought this one out

July 14, 2009 9:18 AM
 

Mike C said:

There are somewhere on the order of 300 million people alive now, but keep in mind that a lot of SSNs have been assigned to people who are no longer alive; and they never get reassigned.  The SSA has suggested they'll start assigning the first 5 digits randomly, but the authors of the report suggested that won't improve security enough.  They recommend assigning the entire SSN randomly from the pool of available numbers.

Changing the SSN to include alpha characters would definitely increase security (36 possible characters per position), but it would be a huge cost to businesses that have implemented systems dependent on all-numeric SSNs.

July 14, 2009 10:19 AM
 

Mike H said:

I heard a suggestion once.  Since so many places use SSN as an Identifier, why not treat it like a login?  But then let each person establish and change as frequently as they like, a corresponding password?

So my very lazy barber can keep a database of customers by SSN all he wants, SSN being virtually public I have no qualms about revealing it (and unlike my phone number it does not change and guarantees him a unique customer key).  But I do NOT give him my password.

The reality is SSN is a national ID number and it is (miss)used for all sorts of things besides taxes and it is virtually public.  So go ahead and make it completely public, but let us protect our privacy and accounts etc. with a password.

And no, I don't know who you're going to call when you forget your password.... that would be a horrible job!

July 22, 2009 3:29 PM
New Comments to this post are disabled

This Blog

Syndication

News

Powered by Community Server (Commercial Edition), by Telligent Systems
  Privacy Statement